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Market Cycles, Power Politics
and the Latest North – South Energy
Trade Conflict
PAUL A WILLIAMS
ABSTRACT Energy trade periodically aligns Northern importing – consuming
countries against predominantly Southern producing – exporting countries.
Conflict appears to follow a cyclical pattern, whereby Northern firms invest
in developing Third World hydrocarbon resources to meet consumer demand
until market conditions enable unilateral efforts by host sovereigns to augment
fiscal take and ownership share and to impose output restrictions, thereby
elevating prices and revenues. Although markets eventually correct themselves,
major consuming-country governments, to the extent that seller’s markets
attributable to exporter actions harm short-term consumer welfare and
alternative options for restoring buyer’s markets are lacking, have varying
incentives to support military intervention. Shifting market conditions and
power balances suggest six ideal-typical energy trade conflict strategies.
Finally, to the extent that exporting states succeed in converting higher
hydrocarbon revenues into energy-intensive economic growth, co-operative
phases within this conflict pattern could yield to increasingly zero-sum inter-
consumer rivalry.
Energy trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) are again pitting ‘Northern’
consumer and corporate interests against sovereign producers in the global
‘South’.1 As the history of the oil sector indicates, multinational firms
extracted Southern energy reserves to supply Northern consumption
requirements until market conditions enabled Third World producing –
exporting countries to enlarge sovereign shares of asset values and gain
control over extraction. Sustained price hikes then brought demand down,
while bringing undeveloped geographical and geological frontiers into play,
which multiplied exporters and strained collective output discipline, already
attenuated by exporters’ proclivity to raise output to serve expanding non-oil
fiscal budgets. Recent upsurges in consumption and assertions of sovereign
control over FDI suggest that a political – economic ‘market cycle’ is
recurring.
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While responsive to corporate energy concerns, Northern governments are
electorally compelled to weigh the negative short-term economic effects of
energy-price ‘spikes’ more heavily in their calculations. Depending on the
extent to which actions in exporting territories harm consumer welfare,
alternative options are lacking, and home corporations cannot acquire
upstream assets, these governments have incentives to increase control over
hydrocarbon-rich territory. Superior power-projection capabilities and
relatively low petrol taxes increase US support for external coercion.
However, although the USSR’s collapse permitted more assertive Northern
intervention in the Persian Gulf, the present Iraq occupation reveals that
force can be balanced by non-state opposition, since insurgency and
infrastructure sabotage, by raising the costs of oil and intervention elsewhere,
have probably emboldened wider resource-centric resistance movements and
stimulated efforts to curb consumption and develop alternative sources.
Conversely, some Third World exporters have developed greater social
knowledge of problems associated with the ‘resource curse’, providing
incentives to restrain upward price rachets and non-hydrocarbon fiscal
spending. Ironically, if this enables permanent increases in exporters’ energy
consumption, North – South conflict could become coterminous with less
tractable forms of consumer rivalry.
After examining analytical frameworks of enquiry into North – South
energy-centric conflict, this article traces how market forces have interacted
with power politics in the oil sector. It then presents a typology featuring six
ideal-typical conflict scenarios, each beginning with specific strategic rent-
seeking actions that hypothetically oppose Northern corporate and consumer
interests to those of Southern exporters. Finally, it assesses the possibility of




Realism offers an intuitive explanation of energy trade conflict. Material
scarcity provides an obvious incentive to dominate natural resource supplies
or to otherwise influence the terms of their trade. Defensive motives include
preserving consumption levels and stabilising the world economy for
importing countries and securing necessary revenue levels for exporting
states.2 Conversely, offensive drives to increase control seek the capacity to
deny resources to others.3
Among themselves, governments of consuming countries have unequal
capacities to force adjustment on others. For example, many OECD countries,
even oil producers Britain and Norway, have based energy policies on high
petrol tax rates that curtail consumption.4 Conversely, US governments have
allowed higher consumption, while using price controls and later relatively
low end-use taxation to moderate upward pressure on retail fuel prices.


































could have stimulated domestic output as well as lowered consumption and
global inflationary pressures.5 This policy reflects the USA’s ability to use
dollars not only to finance budget deficits, amassed at least in part to pay for
military spending associated with preserving access to distant-source
petroleum output, and current-account deficits, which include higher-priced
oil imports, but also to reduce the real costs of oil-trade transactions via
dollar devaluation.6
For Realists, however, military intervention in resource-rich areas remains
the ultima ratio of outcomes in the energy sector, as it does for great-power
politics. Military coercion vis-à-vis the energy trade has been recurringly
salient, as Northern, especially US, government capacities have gradually
become commensurate with will. The 1973 Arab states’ oil embargo
prompted Nixon to develop an unexecuted contingency plan for seizing
Gulf oilfields.7 However, the end of the cold war power balance opened a
seemingly unfettered path to the respective 1991 and 2003 US-led operations
Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, which potentially represent a new phase of
‘resource war’, not only in the context of post-1985 upturns, and projected
future rises, in Northern dependence on Persian Gulf oil imports, but also in
relation to forecasts of a 2010 ‘peaking’ in global oil output.8
However, the post-Saddam oil market has also revealed that geopolitical
outcomes are not fully determined in great power capitals. As resource
revenues provide a disproportionately larger share of their total incomes,
exporting countries should react more intensely to adverse market changes
than major consumer states, which spend relatively less of their GDPs on
energy imports.9 Technological innovation may obliterate certain defensive
obstacles, but even the IT-based ‘revolution in military affairs’, bestowing
panoramic command of ‘common’ spaces on the USA, does not provide
commensurable leverage over the ‘contested zones’,10 where commodity
extraction and initial shipment are likely to be located. Even Realist scholars
acknowledge that great power intervention must often surmount longer
distances, difficult terrain, logistical vulnerabilities (eg extended supply lines)
and nationalist sentiment.11 Control is costlier to assert over more distantly
concentrated resources, especially when ‘obstructable’ resources, for which
‘transportation can be . . . blocked by a small number of individuals with
relatively inexpensive weapons’, aid otherwise weaker parties to an armed
conflict.12
Prospect theory
Developed to explain anomalies in expected-utility models of decision
making, prospect theory’s focus on risk seeking to avert losses emphasises
that advantages should accrue to actors attempting to consolidate previous
gains rather than to those engaging in aggression to obtain anticipated
ones.13 This notion holds relevance in the area of North – South energy trade
relations to the extent that duration of extant market structures increases
defenders’ leverage. Exporting countries should engage in more effective
collective protection of status quo asset valuations against the negative effects

































of sudden supply gluts or demand dropoffs, or when accumulated gains in
more gradually emergent seller’s markets are threatened. Conversely,
importing countries should act more strenuously both to preserve an
established buyer’s market against imminent threats or to alter situations
resulting from rapid supply reductions that can credibly be attributed to
actions occurring in exporting territories.14
Unilateral acts by Northern multinational corporations (MNCs) in
dropping posted crude oil prices, on which Southern fiscal takes were
calculated, to compete in a soft market galvanised the Organisation of
Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) 1960 founding. Even in its 1970s
heyday OPEC members attributed contemporaneous oil price inflation to
broader economic changes originating in earlier dollar devaluation. Drastic
curtailment of demand and export revenues after the late 1990s financial
crises improved members’ co-ordination with each other and with non-OPEC
exporting countries in limiting output to shore up prices. In contrast, the
post-1985 emergence of a buyer’s market and subsequently renewed
dependence on Persian Gulf oil, including Iraq’s, increased importing-
country interest in opposing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and preventing even
larger losses of Saudi and United Arab Emirates (UAE) supply. The post-
1998 concertation of supply restraint provoked US consternation over OPEC
contributions to price volatility, eliciting calls to criminalise its perceived
price-fixing activity.15
Social constructivism
Finally, constructivist approaches help to identify the relative institutional
prevalence and defensibility of typically ‘Northern’ or ‘Southern’ positions.
Arguing that material resources acquire particular meanings from being part
of larger social structures, which also consist of shared knowledge and agent
practices that (re)produce these structures, constructivists maintain that ‘only
because of socially defined use do . . . raw materials constitute resources,
which are also assets when they are constituted in reference to immediate
ends, or interests’.16
Decolonisation placed Third World states’ developmental aspirations in
stark contrast to extant foreign control over their hydrocarbon income sources.
Host countries’ nominal proprietorial control over subsoil resource access
could be usurped because they were unable to add value without foreign
capital and personnel, reinforcing legal recognition of ‘compensation to the
finder of a lost property’.17 Backed by pacta sunt servanda and international
arbitration, concession contracts gave sovereign states rents, consisting of a
royalty and later at least half of the profits, in return for allowing the seven
major multinational companies to find, produce and sell oil. The rules of the
game favoured, and were reproduced by, corporate practices, such as denying
export markets to countries, eg Mexico in 1938, Iran in 1951 and Iraq in 1961,
trying to assert fuller sovereignty over their oil industries.18
However, perceived corporate derogations of social norms led to OPEC’s


































reduction in posted prices of their Middle Eastern crudes reduced the
differential between posted and discounted actual prices, by which exporting-
country governments had actually been earning more than 50% of profits at
companies’ expense.19 OPEC’s charter preamble states that members ‘can no
longer remain indifferent to the attitude . . . adopted by the Oil Companies in
effecting price modification’ and should work to restore the earlier price
structure, require companies to consult on necessary adjustments, and ensure
price stabilisation via ‘regulation of production’.20
Third World state sovereignty over territorial resources now represents the
prevailing social knowledge, even to the extent of being blamed for
unfavourable market conditions. Norway was instrumental in insisting that
the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), whose subsidiary Transit Protocol
aimed to widen non-Russian access to Gazprom-controlled export pipelines
traversing Former Soviet Union (FSU) territory, include a clause affirming
‘Sovereignty over Energy Resources’. Northern scholars expressed scepticism
that Venezuela would allow arbitration provisos to be inserted into joint-
venture contracts and, while the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) obligates Canada to maintain a certain percentage of oil exports to
the USA, it leaves Mexico’s oil sector nationalised.21 Even OPEC allies of the
USA remain reluctant to re-liberalise upstream energy sectors, given
institutional memories of the concession system and pre-nationalisation
disputes with MNCs over unsustainable field production rates.22
The ‘resource curse’ concept provides an alternative discourse co-optable
by powerful Northern agents. It argues that dependence on resource revenues
worsens economic distortions, fosters corruption and incites sub-national
violence, facilitated by the ‘lootability’ of resources per se.23 Yet using this
concept to justify different governance of Third World energy sectors also
entails greater transparency in revenue collection and equity in distribution,
as large segments of Southern populations believe that theft of their resource
wealth results from FDI.24 Thus, coalition authorities were admonished about
violent reaction to perceptions that the Iraq invasion was driven by ‘US neo-
colonialism’; Al-Qaida has exploited populist sentiment against the ‘theft’ of
the Muslim world’s oil resources; and Bolivian leader Evo Morales bluntly
stated, after unilaterally raising government revenue share from MNC natural
gas operations and sending troops to occupy fields in 2006, that ‘The looting
by foreign companies has ended’.25 In Turkey, which holds most of the
world’s boron reserves, criticism of the low purchase price of an allegedly
proposed sale to a US firm of an entity that controls the reserves can be
contextualised in relation to successful tests of boron compounds as a storage
medium for hydrogen in fuel-cell vehicles.26
Market cycles and power politics: the case of petroleum
By 1970 OPEC members were exerting greater control over oil supply. General
Southern aspirations to control natural resource wealth, as articulated in the
UN General Assembly’s 1962 resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, itself embedded in OPEC’s own 1968 Declaratory Policy,

































propelled progressive increases in tax-reference prices, royalties, tax rates,
acreage relinquishment and government participation, while Arab – Israeli
wars furnished a conducive political setting for increasingly potent Arab oil
boycotts. Latent advantages inhering in the immobility of extractive activity
were reinforced by the 1960 – 70 doubling of consumer demand, the 1970
peaking of domestic US oil supply and loss of spare capacity, and OPEC’s
expanded share of total output to over half.27
Market maturation played an enabling role. Diffusion of technology and
marketing know-how eroded entry barriers and intra- OPEC communication
amplified the ‘demonstration effect’ of Libyan and Algerian asset expropria-
tions on the actions of other members.28 Between 1970 and 1980 OPEC national
oil companies’ average share of production increased from one-fifth to nearly
four-fifths, while the majors’ portion fell from 72% to 17%. Given oil’s low
short-term demand elasticity, price hikes massively boosted oil exporters’
‘petrodollar’ revenue, from US$6 billion in 1973 to $107 billion in 1980. This,
albeit cycling back to importing countries via Northern banks, aggravated
inflation, as consumption did not fall until hydrocarbon price deregulation
allowed the 1979 – 80 oil shock to register its full recessionary impact.29
Responses by governments of Northern consuming countries were
primarily defensive in nature, as represented in the 1974 creation of the
International Energy Agency (IEA) and its programmes to co-ordinate, with
MNCs, storage and release of supplies to cover OECD shortages, and to alter
market structure by lowering demand and exploiting non- OECD oil.
Eventually scarcity reflected in higher prices curtailed demand not only via
recession but also through the longer-term inducement to conserve, improve
efficiency, innovate and substitute, and prices of piped natural gas in ‘take or
pay’ contracts are now typically indexed to oil prices. Energy demand fell by
3% during 1979 – 83, with oil losing a 10% share of that demand and OPEC
losing the same proportion of total oil demand.30
Among producers expectations of rising scarcity and prices yielded
diametrically opposed responses. Price hikes ensuing from the 1973 – 74 and
1979 – 80 oil shocks initially propelled more extreme OPEC efforts to shut in
capacity. Conversely, MNCs, denied equity in OPEC fields, gained favourable
tax treatment and used advanced technology to obtain oil elsewhere.
Corporate activity shifted to numerous offshore non- OPEC territories, and
much later even to those of OPEC member states Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria and
Qatar; to developmental frontiers entailing higher transportation costs, as in
the Caspian and Central Asia; and to unconventional onshore Canadian and
Venezuelan oil. By 1982, when even its lowest-cost suppliers were applying
production quotas, OPEC had been relegated to a ‘residual supplier’ of the
shrinking gap between falling demand and rising non- OPEC supply.31
By the early 2000s Southern national companies were producing and
exporting hydrocarbons to reflect their sovereign authorities’ high discount
rates, whereby selling oil is preferred to leaving it in the ground because of
expanding budgetary needs, which fuelled problems associated with the
aforementioned ‘resource curse’. Iraq exemplified this issue. While geogra-


































incentives to enforce neighbours’ quotas through force, these factors impelled
major Northern opposition to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, while permitting
efforts to sanction investments in, and sales from, the hydrocarbon sectors of
Iraq, Iran and Libya. Yet, as market forces again buoyed oil imports, rising
dependence on Persian Gulf supplies increased the saliency of its under-
invested oil sectors. Having lost older concessions, or otherwise been blocked
by sanctions from investing, in that region, but enticed by the prospects of
entering the Caspian region to replenish reserves, MNCs sought home-
government support for a ‘non-proprietorial fiscal regime’ to protect future
energy investments, as articulated in the ECT, bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), and production-sharing agreements (PSAs), by which corporations
arguably increase earnings by inflating ‘cost oil’ accounts.32
The post-1999 return of the seller’s market, caused largely by an upturn
in Chinese consumption, aligned Northern, especially US, consumer and
corporate interests in antipathy towards OPEC policies. Suspicion lingers
that the 2003 Iraq war represented an offensive to grab oil and weaken
OPEC, backed by evidence that coalition oversight has been enveloping Iraq
in the fold of neoliberal governance centred on PSAs with arbitration
provisos.33 Yet violent non-state resistance in Iraq and elsewhere, notably
Colombia, Ecuador, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, has threatened supplies,
thereby undergirding prices, emboldening world-wide efforts to tighten
sovereign control over the terms of hydrocarbon FDI and outflow, and
heightening the potency of major producers’ threats to divert or embargo
exports.34
Classifying North – South energy trade conflict
This section proposes a typology consisting of six analytically distinct rent-
seeking strategies pertaining to North – South energy trade. Relevant
strategic action is initiated by Southern exporters or by Northern interests
to target the other group directly or indirectly and occurs either in buyer’s or
seller’s markets. These two sets of differentiations determine the approximate
‘defensiveness’ or ‘offensiveness’ of action. Relevant balances of power re-
present key antecedent conditions, as the target’s capacity for opposition or
adjustment limits the efficacy of the strategy.
While inter-state resource-related wars also encompass armed conflict
among sovereign exporters and among salient consuming countries, ‘energy
war’ here designates armed action by importing – consuming governments to
prevent or to overturn producing – exporting countries’ legal and physical
control over relevant energy supplies. As Table 1 suggests, ‘defensive energy
war’ is typically intended to forestall threats of export cutoffs, or overturn
sudden cutoffs, which sometimes occur in order to change a buyer’s market
that has been exacerbated by inter-producer quota cheating and related
disputes over market share. If power is also less unbalanced (from now on,
meaning in favour of consumers), strategic efficacy is related to collective
unity of the relevant number of consuming states required to effectuate the
action, as well as to likely levels of counter-resistance. Operation Desert

































Storm exemplifies the stimulus provided by anticipated reductions in future
trade.35 However, this action category could logically extend to cover
backing for the 1953 anti-Mossadegh coup following nationalisation of MNC
oil assets in Iran and US joint military alliances and exercises with co-optable
producing – exporting regimes, especially Caspian states, in the mid-to-late
1990s.36
Conversely, an ‘offensive energy war’ by importer – consumer countries
seeks to compel sovereign exporters to increase supply or relinquish control
over it. This is most likely to occur under more slowly emergent seller’s
market conditions, which can be aggravated by consumers’ own demand-side
pressure on prices. Operation Iraqi Freedom, while incorporating a larger
myriad of causal factors, most closely approximates this type of conflict.37
Power is likely to be more unbalanced, so limits on the efficacy of military
force stem from non-state resistance, as in Iraq, where oil assets sustained
over 350 attacks from June 2003, the first month after the conclusion of
formal combat operations, to September 2006.38
Four other strategies centre on struggles over distribution of rents from
the energy trade. Here, rent seeking aims to aggrandise shares of rising or
falling asset values. ‘Defensive asset/revenue gain’ encompasses producer
efforts to form cartels and co-ordinate action to defend price floors in
robust buyer’s markets. Examples include OPEC’s 1960 formation and wider
and more disciplined efforts to curtail supply after the 1986 and 1997 price
collapses.39 Power is likely to be more unbalanced, so effective action will
depend on a level of producer discipline that prevents quota violations,
which may in turn hinge on the ability of a ‘swing’ producer, like Saudi
Arabia, to tactically over-produce in the strategic interest of punishing
cheaters.
‘Offensive asset/revenue gain’ signals expectations of robust seller’s
markets. Tax and royalty hikes, as well as asset expropriations, reallocate
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revenue and property to sovereign exporters, and punitive boycotts work to
the extent that consumer access to alternative options, including military
power, is constrained. Cases include early 1970s Libyan and Algerian
unilateral company output restrictions and asset confiscations and later the
1973 oil embargo. Various producers may plausibly have been emboldened
by the 2003 Iraq war’s conjoined effect of straining US power-projection
capabilities, reducing Iraqi oil output and elevating prices to impose
increasingly stringent terms on hydrocarbon FDI. Arguably repeating the
aforementioned Libyan –Algerian ‘demonstration effect’, Russia inspired
Venezuela and, in turn, Bolivia, to use punitive tax measures as leverage to
acquire governing control over assets and operations of non-state energy
firms.40 Similar manifestations of ‘resource nationalism’ have occurred even
in Chad and Turkmenistan, two landlocked and highly isolated states
seemingly in greatest need of foreign efforts to bring their hydrocarbons
to market.41 Russian state-led companies have also employed gas and oil
cutoffs and threatened to divert supplies to Asia to obtain more money from
FSU buyers, to punish pro-Western FSU governments, and to acquire
downstream assets as payment-in-kind.42 Oil is a relatively fungible
commodity, but Venezuela’s concessionary sales to neighbours, producer
agreements to augment pipeline capacity to, and refinery capacity in, China,
and long-term Asian investment and purchasing contracts for Persian Gulf
hydrocarbons could restore sufficient pre-1973 degrees of trading inflexibility
to make threats to divert exports more credible.43
Northern consumer and corporate gains potentially deny assets and
revenue to exporters. ‘Offensive asset/revenue denial’ encompasses MNC
efforts to augment booked reserve values, the corporate analogy to ‘offensive
energy war’. Again, the former is more likely to occur in seller’s markets
when overall power is more unbalanced, but sectoral influence favours
sovereign exporters. Cases include post-World War II concessions or the
currently salient neoliberal, PSA-centric governance trends in the energy
sectors of smaller Third World economies.44 It is most likely to face obstacles
in the form of non-state opposition to privatisation, to the latter’s effects on
revenue distribution or to corporate symbols of alien presence, resulting in
force majeure stoppages of oil exports and related violence against foreign
installations, contractors and workers.45
Finally, consumer governments may engage in ‘defensive asset/revenue
denial’ by banning sales and investments related to the energy sectors of
targeted countries. Defensiveness stems not only from the strategy’s
proximity to hostile actions by sanctioned regimes but also from the fact
that it allows non-sanctioned exporters to reap additional gains from filling
vacated markets, and this strategy is enabled by buyer’s markets.46 US-led
sanctions against Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan comprise prominent examples.
Efficiency depends on near-universal willingness not to break sanctions, a
discipline that is harder to maintain as prices rise. In this vein, growing
importer China has sought, by offering enticements such as arms, conces-
sional loans and politico-diplomatic support, to consolidate energy-centric
ties with sanctioned exporters like Iran and Sudan.47

































North – South energy trade as inter-consumer rivalry
Previous sections highlight the rough market-cyclical patterns of North –
South energy trade conflict. Specifically this conflict has generally moderated
when economic complementarity prevails. However, other factors may
further exacerbate North – South energy conflict. One issue centres on the
possibility that non- OPEC production of conventional oil is reaching its ‘peak’
or maximum.48 This would leave only hydrocarbons from unconventional
sources, such as bitumen and tar sands, and those from conventional sources
in deepwater reserves below 500 meters, available. But these would be more
expensive, either geologically or because extraction relies on steam heating
generated by natural gas, the most accessible supplies of which may also be
reaching output peaks.49 Persian Gulf states could obtain firmer market
command, but even this area’s largest onshore fields are maturing, as reflected
in increased use of energy-intensive enhanced recovery techniques, such as gas
and water injection, in Saudi Arabia, where spare production capacity of one
million daily barrels equalled nearly three-quarters of OPEC’s total in January
2006 and the world’s largest refinery narrowly escaped bombing.50
Dire warnings of impending supply downturns are not novel. Moreover,
estimated dates of decline tend to recede in the presence of technological
advances and even thanks to the dubiously beneficial prospects of ‘frontier’
energy deposits made accessible by the melting of the Arctic icecap.51
However, demand pressures threaten to worsen hydrocarbon scarcity if more
Southern exporters follow Northern consumption trajectories. Developing
countries on average consume a tenth of the commercial energy per capita
that developed countries use and three-fifths of an estimated one tonne of oil-
equivalent threshold needed for societal development.52 While once a minor
petroleum exporter, as was the USA, China, which became a net oil importer
in 1993 and imported just under half its total supply in 2004, exemplifies
rapid economic expansion driving similar growth in oil consumption and
intensifying competition for imports.53
Most major energy exporters hold the unique position, if oil revenues
promote economic diversification, to raise consumption and meet their needs
from domestic sources.54 Sizable post-1998 hydrocarbon export revenues,
instead of being recycled or spent to import Northern products to the extent
they were 30 years ago, are now being used, perhaps reflecting social
knowledge of the ‘resource curse’, to lower national debts, make foreign
portfolio investments (thereby limiting US interest rates), create oil-
stabilisation funds and support domestic private sectors.55 OPEC’s average
consumption over 1973 – 2003 has risen from 3% to 20% of its total crude oil
production.56 Gulf Arab gasoline consumption has shown similar growth
and Middle Eastern oil demand is expected to grow by nearly one million
daily barrels from 2003 to 2006.57 Finally, although mostly the result of
logistical barriers to liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade growth, OPEC members
consume most of their natural gas output, which may supply over 50% of the
total Arab energy market by 2015 for environmental reasons.58 Nonetheless,


































upward ratchet in hydrocarbon prices should induce more resilient demand
reduction and the manufacturing of more domestically accessible fuel from
crops, like sugar-based ethanol in Brazil, nuclear power and even diesel made
from gas or coal.59
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